Edito : The Impasse

Edito

The Impasse

by Robert ASSADOURIAN

UN resolution 1701 has temporarily ended the peculiar conflict in the Middle East between Hezbollah, a Shia Islamist politico-religious organization that is a quasi-state in Southern Lebanon and Israel, a true state whose disputed right to existence nourishes its powerful dissuasive force, sometimes to excess. For the Lebanese, the tragic paradox of this 34-day confrontation is that they are the civil victims of a conflict that isn't even theirs, with nearly 1500 dead and immense damage to property.

It all began on July 12 when Hezbollah kidnapped two Israeli soldiers and in response, the Israeli aviation launched destructive raids over Southern Lebanon. This provocation sparked off a conflict that was started with the assent, or even at the behest, of Iran, as it constituted a clever diversion from the endless negotiations around its contested and maybe even dangerous nuclear program.

The ambiguity surrounding the intentions of the belligerents at the time of the ceasefire on August 14th 2006 has been clear. Hezbollah accepted the ceasefire, its cries of victory and its determined resistance in the field notwithstanding, because it pays heed to its considerable losses, the destruction in Lebanon and, especially, the aura it has acquired in the Arab world. In this way, Hezbollah can gloss over all the consequences of a conflict that it set off and which is now blamed especially on Israel. On its side, Israel , which has lost 114 soldiers, entered into this war as though it were a routine operation. In spite of their advantage in the field, the Israelis were surprised by the arduous advance of their infantry and the resistance opposed by the Shia militias, which dug their heels in. When instant victory did not happen, and given the extent of the collateral damage on the populations, Israel preferred a ceasefire to a stalemate.

Both observers and the protagonists themselves know that the end of hostilities is only an interlude, a mere truce before the next confrontation! The UN's resolution 1701 provides for an interposing force of 15,000 men, but it is vague on too many points, because it has to juggle two antagonistic determinations: Israel wants to preserve its right to self-defence, and Hezbollah, although it has called off all hostile acts, doesn't seem at all ready to demilitarise.

As soon as the conflict started, France, along with the United States, brought discussions before the Security Council concerning a project to provide a solution to the crisis. Initially, it made its own participation subject to the decided-upon means for action, and dependent on the participation of the countries providing the contingents. It even declared itself ready to take over command of a multinational peace force. It has obtained just that, although it will turn over command to Italy after February 2007! Our European partners are doubtful as to French leadership because our attitude during the Iraqi affair, the French opposition to the May 29 2005 referendum, and the impending end of the Chirac era are so many handicaps.

Europe, presided over by Finland, can choose either the French position or the British position. The divergences concern the mission of an interposing force, which should be a robust peace force in order to disarm Hezbollah, because the Lebanese Army, which is providing support to the UNIFIL, is incapable of doing so.

UNIFIL 2 and French objectives are : 1) Maintain the ceasefire; 2) Liberate Lebanon from the grip of Hezbollah; 3) Avoid the return of Syria to Lebanon; and 4) Help to rebuild Lebanon. Objectives 3 and 4 are truly utopian!

Since 1996, Hezbollah's leaders have managed to make their organization sacred in the eyes of the Lebanese population. Furthermore, the growing popularity of the Shiite Hassan Nasrallah during this entire conflict is such that it is hampering al Qaeda, which tends to be anti-Shia due to its Salafist Sunni leanings. The question is: Are these two extremist organizations, which both lay claim to a radical Islamism, going to unite in Lebanon even though they are clashing in Iraq? Also, the United States is displeased with Syria's logistic support and Iran's financial support (and Iran also supplies missiles), but these are essential for Hezbollah. Another question is: Is this conflict the prelude to one between the United States and Iran?

Obviously, the Shia movement left in Southern Lebanon is not going to demilitarise. It will hide its arms temporarily, or use them either less or not at all. It has developed new tactics adapted to guerrilla warfare; its ambushes, furthermore, were lethal for Tsahal. Hezbollah has arms that proved how efficient Shiite militias can be - first of all with the more than efficient improvised explosive device (IED), and then with its arsenal of highly mobile Iranian missiles scattered over Lebanon, sometimes "buried" in villages right among the populations. To neutralize these missiles, Israel destroyed way too much.

The deployment of the Lebanese Army in the South is not the indispensable Muslim complement to INIFIL, to judge by its weakness and lack of determination. Lebanon, whose very existence is being threatened, has been Syria's and Iran's strategic tool for regional destabilization for too long, and its army cannot be considered as an efficient interposing force. In the Middle East, Law without Force is always devoid of Power.

Israel controls entry into Lebanon by air and by sea. Israel would like to use UNIFIL to establish a total blockade along the Syria-Lebanon border to isolate Hezbollah and dry up its source of arms.

Caught between Scylla and Charybdis, the UNIFIL is condemned either to total inertia in order to guarantee its own safety, or to perilous action. No political agreement covers UNIFIL's mission. Disarmament is to be carried by the Lebanese or by the Muslim contingents to come. The right to open fire is poorly defined. With a vague mandate, the 2000 French soldiers will be laying their lives on the line without being able to defend themselves. These troops are considered by many in the Arab world as the secular arm of the West that they reject - but from which they are happy to accept financial subsidies.

In the name of outdated grandeur, France is exposing its soldiers in Lebanon to no good purpose. Peace in the Middle East is dependent neither on their presence nor on the various financial contributions, but to the willingness of the belligerents! The next confrontation is perfectly predictable, because each side is digging their heels in and has no confidence in the other. And Gaza and Hamas, which have been overlooked during the crisis, are in turmoil.